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Abstract:  The Review of Business Taxation chaired by Mr John Ralph has suggested
sweeping changes to business taxation in Australia.  In particular it has been
proposed that accelerated depreciation prov sions be removed to finance a reduction
in the company tax rate.  If some degree of accelerated depreciation is to be retained,
it is suggested that this should involve a uniform loading on depreciation rates for all
assets.  The aim is to provide a more uniform treatment of assets with different
economic lives.  This paper examines the neutrality of these proposals for
unincorporated enterprises and companies owned by Australian shareholders.  It is
shown that with positive inflation, the proposal to remove accelerated depreciation
altogether would provide a bias favouring longer-lived assets.  In the absence of
inflation a system of uniform loadings would provide a bias favouring shorter-lived
assets although at very low rates of inflation, this bias can be reversed.  The biases
created by a system of non-accelerated depreciation or a system of uniform loadings
would, however, be small relative to those created by current depreciation provisions.
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11.  Introduction
The 'Review of Business Taxation' chaired by Mr John Ralph in its two volume
document A Platform for Consultation (hereafter the Ralph Report) has suggested
sweeping changes to business taxation in Australia.  These include amendments to
capital gains tax provisions, the elimination of accelerated depreciation, and a
reduction in the company tax rate from 36 per cent to 30 per cent.
A particular problem with current Australian accelerated depreciation provisions
identified in the Ralph Report is the way in which these are not neutral with respect to
the economic lives of assets.  Other things equal, it appears attractive for all forms of
investment to be taxed as neutrally as possible so that the tax system does not divert
investment away from areas providing higher pre-tax returns to areas providing lower
pre-tax returns.  If the tax system biases investment decisions, this will tend to reduce
national income relative to what would be the case if the same amount of capital were
invested but tax provisions were more neutral.
In the Ralph Report, concern is expressed that as an asset's effective life increases, the
difference between the economic life and the period over which depreciation can be
written off for tax purposes increases.1  It is argued that this tends to favour longer-
lived equipment relative to shorter-lived equipment.
There is scope for confusion over whether the concern being expressed in the Ralph
Report is about absolute or proportionate differences between economic lives and tax
write-off periods.  However, final policy recommendations make clear that it is
proportionate rather than absolute differences that are of concern to the report's
authors.  It is argued that if some element of accelerated depreciation is to be retained,
there should be a uniform proportionate accelerated loading for all assets to produce a
'more uniform treatment of wasting assets with different economic lives'.2  This would
make the proportionate difference between economic lives and tax-write-off periods
the same for all assets.  It should be noted that the report does not claim that this
would make the treatment of assets with differing economic lives completely uniform.
However, the text gives the strong impression that there should be the same
proportionate difference between economic lives and tax-write-off periods to make
the tax system as neutral as possible for assets with differing economic lives.3
2The way that the Australian tax system affects incentives to invest for unincorporated
enterprises and wi ely-held Australian-owned companies has been examined in
Benge (1998).  In line with concerns expressed in the Ralph Report, Benge (1998)
finds that longer-lived equipment tends to be advantaged relative to shorter-lived
equipment (other than very short-lived equipment with economic lives of less than
three years).4
This paper draws on the analysis in Benge (1998) to consider the effects of
eliminating accelerated depreciation.  If tax depreciation schedules were to mirror
economic depreciation and there were no inflation, this would eliminate biases
between assets with different economic lives.  This is a well-known consequence of
economic depreciation which follows from the invariance proposition of Samuelson
(1964).  In the presence of inflation, the proposal to eliminate accelerated depreciation
would not be neutral with respect to assets with differing economic lives.  The cost of
capital (ie, the minimum real pre-tax rate of return at which investment becomes
profitable) will tend to be lower for assets which depreciate more slowly.  This means
that the tax system will tend to be biased in favour of 'longer-lived' assets.5  In this
paper the sizes of these biases are assessed and it is concluded that they are small
relative to current biases at low rates of inflation.
This paper also examines the effects of introducing uniform loadings for all assets.  It
is shown that contrary to the impression given by the Ralph Report, this would not be
neutral with respect to economic lives.  In the absence of inflation, it would tend to
favour shorter-lived relative to longer-lived assets.  By contrast, it is shown that a
scheme suggested by Harberger (1980) would be neutral with respect to economic
lives.  This scheme will be referred to as the neutral investment scheme of Harberger
(NISH).  Harberger's scheme works by allowing some fraction of capital costs to be
expensed (deducted immediately) with the remaining fraction being subject to
economic depreciation.  It is well known that expensing and economic depreciation
are both neutral with respect to asset life.  As Harberger points out, his scheme is
neutral because it is a combination of two neutral schemes.
If the inflation rate is positive, for the NISH to be neutral it would be necessary to
combine expensing with either real or nominal economic depreciation.6  If th  fraction
of expenditure that cannot be expensed is subj ct to historical cost non-accelerated
3depreciation (HCNAD), the NISH would no longer be neutral and would tend to
favour longer-lived equipment.  Relatively low rates of inflation can also reverse the
bias created by a uniform loading and lead to a favouring of longer-lived assets.  Even
with low rates of inflation, there is no longer a presumption that a combination of
expensing and HCNAD would lead to more neutral outcomes than uniform loadings.
Estimates are made of costs of capital under these two possible schemes to examine
their neutrality.  It is shown that at quite low rates of inflation, the Ralph Report's
proposal of uniform loadings may be no more distorting than attempting to apply the
NISH by combining expensing and HCNAD.
The structure of this paper is as follows.  Cost of capital expressions are derived in
section 2 and it is shown that the elimination of accelerated depreciation would not
completely remove tax biases in the presence of inflation.  HCNAD would lead to a
tax bias favouring assets which depreciate more slowly.  Investment biases for
unincorporated enterprises and Australian-owned widely-held firms are examined in
section 3 where it is shown that biases produced by HCNAD are small relative to
current biases.  The effects of uniform loadings and the NISH are examined in section
4 on the assumption of no inflation.  It is shown that uniform loadings would tend to
bias investment in favour of shorter-lived assets whereas the NISH would be neutral
with respect to asset life.  In section 5 numerical estimates are provided to compare
the effects of uniform loadings and the NISH assuming a combination of expensing
and HCNAD.  It is shown that with small levels of inflation there is no presumption
that the NISH is less distorting than uniform loadings.  Concluding comments are
provided in section 6.
2.  Effects of Eliminating Accelerated Depreciation
Firms have incentives to invest until the marginal product of capital is equal to the
user cost of capital or, equivalently, until the net of depreciation marginal product of
capital is equal to the cost of capital.  King (1974 and 1977) examined investment
incentives under a number of possible tax systems.  Benge (1998) modifies King's
work to take account of Australian tax provisions and derives cost-of-capital
expressions for both unincorporated enterprises and companies.
4In this section the cost-of-capital expressions of Benge (1998) are used to consider the
effects of eliminating accelerated depreciation.  Except where otherwise indicated,
assumptions are as in the earlier paper and are discussed more fully there.  In
particular, uncertainty is ignored, it is assumed that all investors are taxed at a uniform
rate 0>m  and it is assumed that the companies being analysed are widely-held firms
owned by Australian non-corporate shareholders.
As was shown in the earlier paper, unincorporated enterprises have incentives to
invest until investments generate a real pre-tax rate of return of
( )( )
d-
p+-
p+d+p--+-
=r
)1)(1(
)1()1((1
m
miZkm u
u (1)
where m is the marginal tax rate of investors, k i  the investment allowance (if any),
Zu is the present value of depreciation allowances per dollar of investment discounted
at the rate )1( mi - , i is the nominal interest rate (assumed to be constant for
convenience), p is the (constant) rate of assumed inflation, and d s the geometric rate
at which the real revenues derived from an asset are assumed to decay.
For companies owned by domestic non-corporate shareholders, costs of capital will
depend on dividend policy and Benge (1998) discusses a number of possible cases.
The tax system will normally provide incentives for domestically-owned firms to
distribute franked dividends and to refrain from paying unfranked dividends.  The
base-case companies considered in that paper re assumed to do this.  In this paper
when considering domestically-owned companies we restrict our attention to these
base-case companies.  It is straightforward, however, to extend the analysis to other
categories of domestically-owned firms.  For base-case companies, if shareholders are
taxed at the rate m, the cost of capital is
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where c is the accrual-equivalent rate of capital gains tax, Zc is the present value of
depreciation deductions per dollar of investment discounted at the rate
( ) )1/()1( ccmi -pa--=f , b is the proportion of the capital stock which is financed
5by debt and a is an expression which takes the value 1 if real gains are taxed and 0 if
nominal gains are taxed.
The Ralph Report suggests eliminating accelerated depreciation but not indexing
depreciation allowances for inflation.  To model this proposal it is assumed that an
asset costing a dollar at the end of year 0 with cash flows which decay at rate d would
be allowed a nominal depreciation deduction of d a  the end of year 1, )1( d-d  at the
end of year 2, 2)1( d-d  at the end of year 3 and so forth.7 This depreciation scheme
would mirror economic depreciation in the absence of inflation.  This means that for
an unincorporated enterprise
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For a company
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This system of depreciation will be referred to as historical cost non-accelerated
depreciation (HCNAD).  Assuming, as is currently the case, that there is no
investment allowance )0( =k , the cost of capital for an unincorporated enterprise
becomes
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Simplifying
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where )1/()( p+p-= ir  is the real interest rate.
In the absence of inflation, ru =r  irrespective of d.  Thus, the tax system would be
require the same pre-tax rate of return on all marginal investments acquired by an
6unincorporated enterprise.  It would be neutral with respect to assets of differing
economic lives acquired by unincorporated enterprises.  If, however, m and p are both
positive, the cost of capital rises with d.
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This means that with positive inflation, HCNAD will not be neutral.  It will tend to
bias investment in favour of assets which depreciate slowly (d is low).  Such
investments will be profitable when they generate lower real pre-tax rates of return
than are required on investments with higher rates of d.  This pr perty of HCNAD
was pointed out by Auerbach (1979).8  This contrasts with three idealised depreciation
schemes discussed in Benge (1998) (nominal economic depreciation, real economic
depreciation and immediate deductibility or expensing) where costs of capital would
be independent of d.
It is instructive to consider two polar cases.  If real cash flows do not depreciate,
0=d .  In this case
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This is the cost of capital for an unincorporated enterprise derived in Benge (1998)
(see Table 2) for the case where firms are allowed to claim deductions for real
economic depreciation (the fall in the real value of assets).  Clearly if d is zero, real
cash flows do not decay over time.  If deductions were allowed for the fall in the real
value of an asset, no deductions would be allowed because the real value of the asset
would remain constant.  Under HCNAD no depreciation deductions would be allowed
either for such a non-depreciating asset.  Thus, for such an asset, real economic
income is being taxed.
At the other polar extreme, 1=d .  For such an asset
ru =r (7)
7This is the expression given in Table 2 of Benge (1998) for the case when nominal
economic depreciation is deductible and firms are taxed on the full nominal income
from an investment.  To see this, consider such an investment costing a dollar which
generates a real pre-tax rate of return of .  If 1=d , such an investment generates a
single positive cash flow one year after it is acquired and then expires.  To provide a
real pre-tax rate of return of r, the nominal cash flow must be n+1  where
ir =p+p+=n )1( .  As the historical cost of the asset is a dollar, the investor will be
able to claim this as a depreciation deduction.  Assuming that the asset is financed
with the investor's own funds, tax will be mim =n .  The investor will be left with
after-tax wealth of )1(1)1(1 mim -+=-n+  and does as well as would have been the
case if the dollar were invested in bonds.  On such an investment the full nominal
economic income is taxable and if the investment generates a real pre-tax rate of
return of r, it is a breakeven investment.
While expressions are more complex, the same intuition carries over to the case of
investment by a company.  Under HCNAD the cost of capital for a company becomes
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Provided 0>p  and cm> , the corporate cost of capital will also rise with d.9
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Once again, it is instructive to examine polar cases.  If 0=d ,
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8This is the corporate cost of capital under real economic depreciation provided in
Table 3 of Benge (1998).  If, on the other hand, 1=d ,
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This is the corporate cost of capital under nominal economic depreciation from Table
3 of Benge (1998).
3.  Effects of Ralph Proposals on Investment Biases
The Ralph proposals affect costs of capital for unincorporated enterprises and
domestically-owned companies in three main ways:
· the removal of capital gains indexation will tend to raise costs of capital;
· reduced taxes on capital gains will tend to reduce costs of capital;
· the elimination of accelerated depreciation will tend to raise costs of capital.
The other major proposal is to reduce the company tax rate to 30 cents in the dollar.
This will not affect incentives for firms pursuing a policy of paying as many franked
dividends as possible.  This is because reduced company tax collections mean
increased personal income taxes (ignoring the fact that some shareholders such as
those below the tax-free threshold are unable to claim imputation credits at present).10
Changes to Capital Gains Taxation
The focus of this paper is on the incentive effects of changes in depreciation
provisions.  However, as the proposal to remove capital gains tax indexation and to
reduce taxes on capital gains will also affect incentives to invest, it is helpful to start
by considering the impact of this change alone.  In this paper it will be assumed that
reduced rates of capital gains taxation involves 80 per cent of capital gains being
taxed.
Costs of capital are estimated in Table 1.  There are a number of assumptions
underlying these estimates.  Current depreciation provisions are described in Benge
(1998) and the relationship between the rate of economic depreciation, d, and the set
9of assets listed in Table 1 are as in that paper.  It is assumed that buildings currently
qualify for the 2.5 per cent deduction for 40 years rather than the higher rate of
deduction applying to buildings used for eligible industrial activities or short-term
traveller accommodation.  Other assumptions are as follows:
· shareholders are all taxed at a rate of 33.0=m  (the average marginal tax rate of
shareholders)11;
· the real interest rate, , is 5 per cent per annum;
· there is a constant inflation rate of 2.5 per cent per annum which is the midpoint
of the Reserve Bank's long-run target range of 2 – 3 per cent;
· 20 per cent of shares are sold each year;
· 40 per cent of a company's capital is financed with debt;12
· under current provisions, shareholders believe that there is a 60 per cent
probability of real gains accruing, a 30 per cent probability of nominal losses
accruing and a 10 per cent chance of real losses but nominal gains accruing.13
With the exception of a minor difference in the assumed inflation rate, all these
assumptions are as in Benge (1998).  While each of these assumptions could be
challenged, the general direction of changes reported in Table 1 seems reasonably
robust to minor changes in these assumptions.
Costs of capital are reported for equipment with economic lives of 3, 5, 10, 20 and 30
years, for trading stock and for buildings.  Results are reported for both companies
and unincorporated enterprises.
Table 1 should be interpreted as follows.  The figures indicate costs of capital, ie, he
real pre-tax rates of return required on various investments.  At these real rates of
return an investor on a 33 per cent marginal tax rate would earn the same after-tax
return as he or she would from investing in bonds which earn a 5 per cent real interest
rate.
The capital gains tax changes do not affect costs of capital for unincorporated
enterprises under the assumptions of the model where investors are assumed to
acquire these assets directly and operate them over their economic lives.  Before and
after the change in capital gains taxation, investment in 3-year equipment would need
to generate a 2.5 per cent real pre-tax rate of return to become marginally profitable.
10
Investment in 5-year equipment would need to generate a 3.8 per cent real pre-tax rate
of return and so forth.  Costs of capital are affected, however, for companies.
Investors acquire an interest in a company and eventually must sell their interest in the
company.  When they do so, the capital gains tax impost becomes relevant.  The
elimination of indexation boosts capital gains taxes that shareholders are required to
pay and hence the real pre-tax rates of return required for investment in companies to
be marginally profitable.
Table 1  Effects of Changes in CGT Provisions on Costs of Capital
3-Yr
Eqpt
5-Yr
Eqpt
10-Yr
Eqpt
20-Yr
Eqpt
30-Yr
Eqpt
Trdg
Stock
Bldgs
Unincorp. Ents.
Current CGT
Provisions
2.5 3.8 3.8 3.6 3.3 5.0 4.0
New CGT
Provisions
2.5 3.8 3.8 3.6 3.3 5.0 4.0
Difference 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Companies
Current CGT
Provisions
4.0 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.2 4.6 4.4
New CGT
Provisions
4.0 4.5 4.5 4.4 4.3 5.0 4.6
Difference 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.2
Table 1 indicates that current depreciation provisions do not treat all forms of
investment neutrally.  Current tax provisions generally tend to favour investment in 3-
year equipment and 30-year equipment relative to investment in equipment with lives
11
of 5- to 20-years, buildings and trading stock.  With the exception of trading stock,
they also generally tend to favour investment by unincorporated enterprises relative to
companies.  By themselves, changes to capital gains tax provisions tend to boost
corporate costs of capital most for investments which are already more-heavily taxed.
They also reinforce the tax bias favouring investment by unincorporated enterprises
relative to companies.
Elimination of Accelerated Depreciation
Table 2 indicates the combined effects of the elimination of accelerated depreciation
and the changes to capital gains tax provisions on costs of capital for unincorporated
enterprises and domestically-owned companies.
Table 2  Overall Effects of Ralph Proposals on Costs of Capital
3-Yr
Eqpt
5-Yr
Eqpt
10-Yr
Eqpt
20-Yr
Eqpt
30-Yr
Eqpt
Trdg
Stock
Bldgs
Unincorp. Ents.
Current
Provisions
2.5 3.8 3.8 3.6 3.3 5.0 4.0
New Provisions 4.9 4.9 4.7 4.5 4.4 5.0 4.2
Difference 2.4 1.1 0.9 0.9 1.1 0.0 0.2
Companies
Current
Provisions
4.0 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.2 4.6 4.4
New Provisions 5.0 5.0 4.9 4.8 4.8 5.0 4.7
Difference 1.0 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.3
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The figures reported in the table suggest that the combination of measures will make
costs of capital for the various forms of investment that unincorporated enterprises
much more equal than before.  A similar pattern is evident in the case of companies.
However, as was discussed in section 2, HCNAD would not be completely neutral.
There is a bias favouring longer-lived assets such as buildings and 30-year equipment.
Finally, consider costs of capital for a given type of asset.  Under current provisions
there are major differences between costs of capital for companies and unincorporated
enterprises.  This is because of the way that current tax provisions end up clawing
back the benefits of tax preferences available to companies but not for unincorporated
enterprises.  Under HCNAD there would be much less difference between costs of
capital for unincorporated enterprises and companies.  The biggest remaining
differences between corporate and unincorporated costs of capital would be for
buildings and longer-lived equipment.
The results reported above have all been calculated assuming 33.0=m .  It was noted
that some domestically-owned companies may be acting in the interests of
shareholders on more extreme tax rates (15.0=m  or 485.0=m ).  These more
extreme tax rates would alter the numbers reported in Table 2 but not the qualitative
conclusions.  It would still be the case that the combination of measures reduced
biases both between the various investments a given firm could undertake and over
whether investment was undertaken by unincorporated enterprises or companies.
Remaining biases would still favour buildings and longer-lived equipment relative to
other assets.
4.  Uniform Loadings and the NISH:  No Inflation
The Ralph Report's recommendation is that if some form of accelerated depreciation
is to be retained, it should consist of a uniform system of loadings.  In this section it is
shown that this system of accelerated depreciation would not generally be neutral.  In
the absence of inflation, it would tend to promote investment in shorter-lived assets
relative to investment in longer-lived assets.  By contrast, however, Harberger's
scheme would be neutral.
13
Uniform Loadings
Suppose that when a dollar of capital is acquired at the end of year 0, tax depreciation
is d* at the end of year 1, *)1(* d-d  at the end of year 2, 2*)1(* d-d  at the end of
year 3 and so forth.  In the absence of inflation, the present value of depreciation
deductions for an unincorporated enterprise on a dollar of investment will be
*)1(
*
d+-
d
=
mr
Zu (11)
In the absence (or presence) of inflation , the present value of depreciation deductions
for a company will be
*
*
d+f
d
=cZ (12)
To take account of the case of uniform loadings, it will be assumed that
db+=d )1(* (13)
where b is the uniform rate of loading.
Costs of capital for unincorporated enterprises and companies can be found by
substituting these values of Z into equations (1) and (2) respectively.
Unincorporated Enterprise
Assume as at present that there is no investment allowance ().0=k   Substituting (11)
into (1) and assuming 0=p  so ri =
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Substituting (13)
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It is straightforward to confirm that provided 0>b , ru falls with d which implies that
this regime favours investment in shorter-lived assets.
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For companies
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Substituting (13)
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Provided mc <  and 0>b , uniform loadings would also tend to promote shorter-
lived relative to longer-lived investments for companies.
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The NISH
The NISH involves firms being allowed to deduct some fraction, q, of capital
expenditure immediately with the remainder being written off over the economic life
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of the asset.  In this case a firm acquiring a dollar of capital at the end of year 0 could
deduct q immediately, dq- )1(  at the end of year 1, )1()1( d-dq-  at the end of year
2, 2)1()1( d-dq-  at the end of year 3 and so forth.  The present value of deductions
for an unincorporated enterprise will be
d+-
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+q=
)1(
)1(
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Zu (18)
For a company the present value of depreciation deductions will be
d+f
dq-
+q=
)1(
cZ (19)
Unincorporated Enterprises
Once more assuming that there is no inflation and no investment allowance
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Simplifying
)1( q-=r mru (20)
This is independent of d which means that this scheme is neutral with respect to asset
life.  The intuition is that the NISH is a linear combination of two methods of
depreciation, both of which are neutral.  It can be seen from Table 2 of Benge (1998)
that in the absence of inflation the cost of capital for an unincorporated enterprise
would be )1( mru -=r  if capital expenditure could be expensed (ie, deducted
immediately).  This is true irrespective of the rate of economic depreciation.  Table 2
of Benge (1998) also records that the cost of capital would be ru =r  nder economic
depreciation irrespective of the rate of economic depreciation.  The NISH provides an
outcome which is the weighted average of these two schemes.  In the extreme where
1=q , it is clear that the NISH is equivalent to allowing expensing and from equation
16
(20) it can be seen that )1( mru -=r .  In the opposite extreme where 0=q , it is clear
that the NISH is equivalent to economic depreciation and from equation (20) ru =r .
Companies
For companies the cost of capital becomes
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Again this expression is independent of  so this scheme would be neutral with
respect to asset life.  The neutrality of the NISH follows once more from the fact that
both expensing and economic depreciation would be neutral with respect to asset lives
for corporate investments.  As is shown in Table 3 of Benge (1998), the cost of capital
under expensing would be )1/()1( cmr --  and the cost of capital under economic
depreciation would be r.  These expressions can be derived by substituting,
respectively, 1=  and 0q  into equation (21).
5.  Uniform Loadings and the NISH with Positive Inflation
When inflation is positive we have seen in section 2 that HCNAD (ie, allowing capital
expenditure to be written off over economic lives) tends to favour longer-lived
relative to shorter-lived assets.  Expensing continues to be neutral but if a linear
combination of expensing and the HCNAD is used, this will relatively favour longer-
lived assets.  We will assume that applying the NISH in the presence of inflation
involves a linear combination of expensing and the HCNAD and so produces this
bias.14  This means that while the neutrality properties of the NISH make this seem
attractive relative to uniform loadings in the absence of inflation, there are no a priori
17
grounds for concluding that the NISH is more neutral than uniform loadings in the
presence of inflation.  This section shows that the opposite may be the case.
In chapter 39 of the Ralph Report uniform loadings of either 20 per cent or 50 per
cent are proposed.  These have similar effects on average to allowing, respectively, 10
per cent or 25 per cent of capital expenditure to be expensed with the remainder
subject to HCNAD.15
Table 3 presents estimates of costs of capital for a 20 per cent uniform loading
(denoted by UL) and for the NISH where 10 per cent of capital expenditure can be
expensed.  Results are reported for unincorporated enterprises and domestically-
owned companies for inflation rates of 0, 1, 2 and 3 per cent per annum.  O her key
assumptions are as follows: the real interest rate, r, is 5 per cent per annum; the
marginal tax rate of shareholders, m, is 33 per cent; nominal gains are taxed but only
80 per cent of such gains are taxable; and that 20 per cent of shares are sold each year.
The real interest rate is assumed to remain constant despite there being different
possible rates of inflation which implies that an unmodified Fisher relationship is
assumed to hold.
In the case where there is no inflation, the NISH would be neutral across assets with
different economic lives while uniform loadings would introduce a bias favouring
shorter-lived assets as was discussed in section 4.  However, biases introduced by
uniform loadings seem extremely small.  In these examples it is assumed that
accelerated loadings or the NISH are not extended to trading stock.  It is unclear how
accelerated loadings could be extended to trading stock.  It would, however, be quite
straightforward to extend the NISH to trading stock by requiring firms to include only
90 per cent of the value of stock on hand when reporting assessable income.  If the
NISH were extended to trading stock and there were no inflation, all costs of capital
would be 4.8 per cent for unincorporated enterprises and 4.9 per cent for companies.
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Table 3  Costs of Capital under 20 Per Cent Uniform Loading and Under a 10
Per Cent NISH
3-Yr
Eqpt
5-Yr
Eqpt
10-Yr
Eqpt
20-Yr
Eqpt
30-Yr
Eqpt
Trdg
Stock
Bldgs
0=p
  UL: UEs
  UL: Companies
4.7
4.9
4.7
4.9
4.8
4.9
4.8
4.9
4.8
4.9
5.0
5.0
4.9
5.0
  NISH: UEs
  NISH: Companies
4.8
4.9
4.8
4.9
4.8
4.9
4.8
4.9
4.8
4.9
5.0
5.0
4.8
4.9
.0=p
  UL: Companies
4.7 4.7
4.9 4.9
4.6 4.6
4.9 5.0
4.6
  NISH: UEs
  NISH: Companies 4.9
4.8 4.7
4.9 4.9
4.6 5.0
5.0 4.8
02.=p
  UL: UEs
  UL: Companies
4.6
4.8
4.6
4.8
4.5
4.8
4.4
4.8
4.4
4.8
5.0
5.0
4.3
4.7
  NISH: UEs
  NISH: Companies
4.7
4.9
4.7
4.9
4.6
4.8
4.5
4.8
4.4
4.8
5.0
5.0
4.2
4.7
03.0=p
  UL: UEs
  UL: Companies
4.5
4.8
4.5
4.8
4.4
4.7
4.2
4.7
4.1
4.7
5.0
5.0
3.9
4.6
  NISH: UEs
  NISH: Companies
4.7
4.9
4.6
4.8
4.4
4.8
4.2
4.7
4.1
4.6
5.0
5.0
3.9
4.6
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While tax provisions might be slightly more neutral under the NISH than under
uniform loadings with no inflation, this result no longer holds if there is ongoing
inflation of as little as 1 per cent per annum.  With 1, 2 or 3 per cent inflation, the
spread of costs of capital are never lower and often higher than under the NISH.  It is
also clear that with as little as 1 per cent per annum inflation, uniform loadings no
longer provide a bias favouring shorter-lived assets.  The bias is reversed and longer-
lived assets become relatively advantaged.
The Reserve Bank long-run target for inflation is in the range 2 – 3 per cent per
annum.  At these sorts of rates, it would seem from the figures presented in Table 3
that the Ralph Report proposal of uniform loadings would be at least as neutral as the
NISH.
The figures suggest, however, that if a system of uniform loadings were introduced,
longer-lived equipment and buildings would be relatively advantaged.  There may be
a case for a higher rate of loading for shorter-lived equipment and a smaller or zero
loading for buildings and longer-lived equipment.  Trading stock would appear to be
relatively disadvantaged and there might be some case for providing some tax relief,
perhaps by requiring firms to only include some proportion (say 90 per cent) of the
cost of trading stock when reporting taxable income.
6.  Concluding Comments
This paper has focussed on the neutrality properties of eliminating accelerated
depreciation or of allowing a system of uniform loadings.  Both of these have been
proposed as options in the Ralph Report.
The paper has shown that eliminating accelerated depreciation entirely would not be
neutral with positive inflation.  It would tend to favour longer-lived relative to shorter-
lived assets.  However, biases would tend to be small compared with current biases if
inflation is in the Reserve Bank target range of 2 – 3 per cent per annum.  In the
absence of inflation a system of uniform loadings would not be neutral (despite
suggestions to the contrary in the Ralph Report).  Shorter-lived assets would be
favoured.  However, even at very low rates of inflation this bias can be reversed and
longer-lived assets may become favoured.
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In the absence of inflation, there would be a preferable method of providing
accelerated depreciation to allowing uniform loadings.  This is to allow some fraction
of capital expenditure to be expensed and the remainder to be subject to economic
depreciation.  At very low rates of inflation, however, this system may end up being
less neutral than the system of uniform loadings proposed in the Ralph Report.  This
does not mean, however, that a system of uniform loadings is the most neutral option
available.  A preferable option might be to provide no loading or a smaller loading for
buildings and/or longer-lived equipment and a higher loading for shorter-lived
equipment.  It might also be desirable to require firms to include only a fraction of the
cost of trading stock when reporting taxable income.
This paper has focussed solely on the neutrality properties of HCNAD, a system of
uniform loadings and the NISH.  A key issu  which has not been addressed is how
winding back accelerated depreciation provisions can affect the overall level of
capital taxation and Australia's aggregate capital stock.  Benge (1999) has shown that
small levels of taxes on capital can impose high marginal excess burdens.  The
efficiency implications of changing the overall level of capital taxation could possibly
be more important than the neutrality issues which have been examined in this paper.
However, assessing the effects of the Ralph Report's proposals on the overall level of
capital taxation is a complex task and is left for further work.
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1  See Ralph et al (1999, p. 106 and pp. 115-123).
2  See Ralph et al (1999, p. 122).
3  Table B.2 on p. 106 of Ralph et al (1999) converts current depreciation provisions to percentage
loadings.  It is also clear from the discussion here that it is differences in these percentage loadings
which are considered to be a major problem of current provisions.
4   For example in Table 6 of Benge (1998) it is reported that if the real interest rate is 5 per cent per
annum, the inflation rate is 2 per cent per annum and investors are taxed at a rate of 33 per cent,
investment by an unincorporated enterprise in 5-year or 10-year equipment would need to generate a
real pre-tax rate of return of 3.9 per cent to be marginally profitable.  On the other-hand a lower real
pre-tax rate of return of 3.4 per cent would suffice for investment in 30-year equipment.
5  In our model a constant geometric rate of economic depreciation, d, will be assumed.  In the context
of this model, talking of shorter- and longer-lived assets is perhaps something of a misnomer inasmuch
as strictly all assets are infinitely lived.  However, if d is high, virtually all earnings of consequence
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will be in early years and it is convenient to talk of these assets as being shorter-lived.  If, d is l w,
earnings of consequence will be derived in later years and it is convenient to talk of these assets as
being longer-lived.
6  Real economic depreciation would allow a deduction for the real fall in market value of assets and
nominal economic depreciation would allow a deduction for the nominal fall.  For further discussion
see Benge (1998).
7  It should be noted that this abstracts from the important difficulty of the Commissioner of Taxation
measuring the economic depreciation rate of an asset, d, d incorporating this in a schedule of
permissible depreciation rates.  Because of this practical difficulty, schedule rates will always depart
from economic depreciation and investment biases are almost certain to be larger than is suggested in
this paper.
8  This does not necessarily mean that user costs of capital will fall for longer-lived assets relative to
shorter-lived assets as is discussed by Kopke (1981).  Nor does it mean that if the rate of economic
depreciation is a choice variable, equipment will necessarily become longer-lived as the inflation rate
increases as is discussed by Abel (1981).  All that is being said is that in the presence of inflation
longer-lived assets would be marginally profitable when they provide lower real pre-tax rates of return
than shorter-lived assets.
9  There are two reasons why c might be less than m.  First, because capital gains are taxed when shares
are sold rather than as gains accrue, the benefits of tax deferral will normally ensure that the effective
rate of capital gains tax is less than the statutory rate.  Second, under proposals put forward in the
Ralph Report capital gains may be taxed at less than the full statutory rate.
10  Note that this conclusion rests on the critical assumption outlined earlier that shareholders are all
domestic residents.  If shareholders were non-residents, the reduction in the company tax rate could
have important effects.
11  This average marginal tax rate comes from Benge (1998).  There is no strong theoretical reason for
expecting firms to optimise for shareholders on the mean tax rate of shareholders.  Many more shares
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are held by superannuation funds (taxed at 15 per cent) and individuals on the top marginal tax rate
(48.5 per cent) than by those close to the mean marginal tax rate and some firms may be acting in the
interests of shareholders on these more extreme rates.  Using these more extreme rates would change
the magnitudes but not the general direction of the results reported in this paper.
12  This affects costs of capital under current provisions but not under new provisions.  With the
elimination of capital gains tax indexation, the cost of capital becomes independent of the proportion of
debt financing.
13  The effect of this assumption is that there will be a 60 per cent chance of real gains being taxed, a 30
per cent chance of nominal gains being taxed and a 10 per cent chance of no capital gain tax under
existing provisions as is discussed in Benge (1998).  This assumption has no effect on costs of capital
under new provisions because capital gains tax is no longer indexed.
14  Applying a linear combination of expensing and either the system of real economic depreciation or
of nominal economic depreciation discussed in Benge (1998) would, by contrast, involve a linear
combination of two neutral schemes which would itself be neutral.  This would be more in spirit with
Harberger's NISH and the nonneutralities discussed in the text should not be seen as a critique of
Harberger's scheme.  It is a critique of combining expensing with HCNAD.
15  In this paper results are presented only for the effects of a 20 per cent uniform loading and the NISH
with 10 per cent expensing.  A comparison of the cases of a 50 per cent uniform loading with a NISH
with 25 per cent expensing provides qualitatively similar results.
